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THERE is an evident trajectory of change marked by the democratic sever from patterns of political authority in Zimbabwe signified on February 11, 2009.
This break was marked by the formation of an inclusive government, which is made up of a tripartite alliance of Zanu PF, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) — led by Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC headed by Arthur Mutambara.
However, a nuanced interpretation of the transition confirms a teleological proposition that the transitional phase of democratisation is a period of great political uncertainty.
Sketching back the contours of history from Chile to South Africa and from Nicaragua to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), scientists observed that transitions are often complex and fragile. Building dams against reverse waves is the top priority for democratic actors in a transition.
In Zimbabwe, the fragmented and fluid new institutional context, where authoritarian elites skeptically co-exist with democratic actors in the hybrid governance system confirms the uncertain nature of most post-conflict or post-authoritarian transitions.
More to the point, the “loiter and linger strategy” evident in Zanu PF and manifesting itself in political bickering and culminating in recurrent institutional immobilism in the governmental structures and other transitional institutions such as COPAC, JOMIC and National Security Council is not surprising at all.
It is a deliberate attempt by hardliners in Zanu PF to frustrate democratic reforms, delay elections and postpone their relegation to permanent political irrelevance. It happened in DRC in 2004, and we continue to observe it in Madagascar, Kenya and Guinea.
Uncertainty and confidence crisis is prevalent in all democratic battlefields ranging from political to economic reform processes.
The constitutional reform exercise is way behind the original schedule and the official reschedule.
The outreach phase was supposed to start soon after first all-stakeholders conference held from July12-13, 2009 but lack of financial resources, directionality, coherence, co-ordination and political will has stalled this critical stage of constitutional reform process.
The National Security Council has only met twice and the parallel Joint Operations Command is still holding regular meetings, contrary to the letter and tenor of the GPA.
Further, the National Economic Council, an important legislative board mandated to provide strategic oversight on the economic stabilisation and growth trajectory is at risk of suffering a stillbirth. The rule of law, which is the corner-stone for macro-economic stabilisation, is still a dream.
Further, Zanu PF announced in the state media on January 28, 2009 that there will be no more concessions in the on-going talks.
The hard-line position of Zanu PF is opportunistically predicated on the recent statements by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, to the effect that MDC-T will be their lodestar in the removal of smart sanctions imposed on the authoritarian elites mainly from or strategically linked to Zanu PF.
This is despite the fact that the conditions which led to the imposition of the restrictive measures are still there.
In Zanu PF, it has been difficult transforming the psychology of liberation struggles into that of democratic consciousness. Farm invasions and harassment of democratic actors are the order of the day. State media is proving to be impervious to democratic pressures.
Zimbabwe’s transition posit a phase whereby the former ruling party is in firm control of state power with the former opposition parties coming in largely as junior partners. To this end, the erosion of authoritarianism and construction of democracy will take longer than anticipated.
An analysis of the transition so far shows that the hardliners in Zanu PF will continue to make outrageous demands, such as “we will make more concessions when sanctions have been removed” only to resist the winds of change blowing across the country. To them, authoritarian regression or democratic reversal is the endgame of the transition, and not free and fair elections.
However, in the words of the late Professor Masipula Sithole, Zanu PF has reached its levels of incompetence and the law of diminishing returns has irreversibly set into motion. Further, authoritarianism is a pathology against which democratic actors rebel. Nothing is permanent except change.
Democratic forces continue to question the democratic legitimacy of the inclusive government since it was not elected by the people.
The authority of the hybrid regime is only appreciated by the democratic actors only to the extent that it leads the country into a free and fair election, which produces uncontested outcome. The Zimbabwe transition is not permanent and an exit point is inevitable.
So Zimbabweans must charter this territory of effective institutional and cultural reforms for real change.
The democratic forces should start to seriously advocate for minimum electoral conditions to be met before the breakthrough post-conflict election, tentatively scheduled for 2011 - after the adoption of a new democratic constitution. Some of the key pre-elections democratic tenets are as follows:
a) Promoting constitutionalism and rule of law to guarantee fairness and openness in electoral matters. No society can claim to be free or democratic without strict adherence to the rule of law. Dictators and authoritarian regimes abandon the rule of law at the first opportunity and resort to brazen power politics leading to all manner of excesses. This is why former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower observed: “The clearest way to show what the rule of law means to us in everyday life is to recall what has happened when there is no rule of law.”
b) Strengthening of civic society organizations to act as purveyors of democratic practices and values in the Zimbabwean body politic.
c) Establishment and institutionalisation of an effective electoral infrastructure, which will guarantee a credible election and concomitantly inauguration and expansion of a democratic authority in Zimbabwe. In more concrete terms there is need for genuine electoral reform, media reforms, security sector reforms and judiciary reforms as a practical way of addressing the legislative, constitutive and ecological factors in the context of a post-settlement election, where fear, mistrust and suspicion will be a common place. As President Barack Obama said to the parliament of Ghana: “In the 21st century, capable, reliable, and transparent institutions are the key to success — strong parliaments and honest police forces, independent judges and journalists, a vibrant private sector, and civil society.”
d) Eradicating material poverty of people, which often promotes electoral clientelism and servitude. Elections will count for little in an atmosphere of crippling poverty, want and despair.
e) Addressing the crisis of accumulation in Zimbabwe, this makes the capture of state power a priceless political project, for which all tactics fair and foul are permissible. This will include demilitarisation of politics in the country.
f) Invitation of regional and international observers and monitors to ensure that the next election is in conformity with the Mauritius Sadc guidelines on the conduct of elections and other international standards and norms.
BY WASHINGTON KATEMA
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