The generals and the war to succeed Mugabe

Obituaries
Recent events have shown the military getting increasingly visible in the race to succeed President Robert Mugabe.

Recent events have shown the military getting increasingly visible in the race to succeed President Robert Mugabe.

GUEST OPINION BY ALEX T MAGAISA

Although the defence forces commander General Constantino Chiwenga denied links to the Lacoste faction which allegedly backs Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa, it would be foolhardy to take such denials seriously. No serving general would openly declare or admit support for a faction or its leader and still expect to keep his job. Naturally, Chiwenga would be expected to deny any links to Lacoste or any faction.

Nevertheless, in order to understand the actual dynamics beyond those denials, one has to gather the scattered parts of the political jigsaw and piece them together so that the bigger picture becomes more visible and clearer.

Having done that, the picture which emerges is that while Mnangagwa’s world appeared to be crumbling only a fortnight ago, after a humiliating public attack by Mandiitawepi Chimene, a party subordinate, a number of factors have converged to suggest that he still retains key backing from important pillars, including the parts of the military.

Apart from the war veterans, the first sign of significant backing for Mnangagwa has come from Chiwenga, who gave a telling interview to The Sunday Mail.

Chiwenga effectively defended Mnangagwa by attacking the G40 faction, which is opposing the latter’s bid for the presidency. Chiwenga’s barely disguised criticism was directed at Jonathan Moyo, believed to be a key architect behind the G40 faction, and Chimene, who verbally assaulted Mnangagwa two weeks ago, allegedly on behalf of the G40 faction.

“We were reading mapepa paakatanga kuti [newspapers when he said] ‘when you want to destroy Zanu PF you need to do it from within’,” said Chiwenga in what is a clear reference to Moyo, to whom the theory of “destroying Zanu PF from within” has been widely attributed. As for Chimene, Chiwenga was even more brutal.

 “This nonsense of someone who was at a refugee camp or was a cleaner moving around telling people that he or she fought in the struggle is just that — nonsense. Where did you fight the liberation war?

“People can smoke marijuana, it is within their rights. Even if it’s to do with traditional spirits, go ahead and smoke — but don’t disturb us because we have lost thousands of innocent sons and daughters,” said Chiwenga. There can be no doubt that Chiwenga was responding to her attack on Mnangagwa. It was Chimene who had claimed during her verbal attack upon Mnangagwa that some people thought she spoke bluntly because she smokes marijuana.

It is notable that while Chiwenga declares his loyalty to Mugabe, he does not condemn the beleaguered leadership of the war veterans in the same terms that he condemns elements of the G40 faction. Like Mnangagwa, while appearing to refuse association with the beleaguered war veterans’ leaders, Chiwenga gives them the benefit of the doubt by questioning the authorship of the controversial communiqué issued after a meeting of the war veterans three weeks ago.

He sticks to the line that the matter is under investigation and describes it not as a document of the war veterans’ leadership but as “attributed” to them. Unlike their boss, Mugabe, the generals are giving the war veterans’ leadership the benefit of the doubt.

What we are observing is war veterans and significant elements of the military closing ranks and rallying around Mnangagwa, who is seen as leading the faction that best represents their interests and aspirations. The military generals know they will soon leave active duty and must prepare for life after it.

Some see themselves taking up a career in politics. However, they have also seen how the G40 approach is built around the erosion of the older war generation in the leadership structure: the so-called liberation generation.

The first stage of the decimation of the liberation generation was successfully achieved with the removal of the [joice] Mujuru faction between 2014 and 2015.

The second stage involves the on-going resistance against, and leading to the removal of Mnangagwa and his Lacoste group, around which the remaining majority of the liberation generation has rallied.

The military generals who are part of this liberation generation realise what is happening and have staked their futures on Mnangagwa and his Lacoste faction. In essence, therefore, the succession battle in Zanu PF is a battle between generations: the liberation generation which wants to keep hold of power and what we may conveniently refer to as the post-liberation generation, which wants to wrest control of the party and country’s leadership.

While the G40 has important points against the exclusivist liberation war narrative of the liberation generation, the major weakness is that because they deny whom they are, they have never actually explained their ideas to make them persuasive. If they did, perhaps their views might find sympathy with a significant portion of the public which is fed up with the exclusivist liberation war narrative as the only justification to claim leadership.

Another boost to Mnangagwa and the Lacoste faction has come from the judiciary, where the High Court last week upheld an application by the beleaguered war veterans’ leadership to bar Chimene and her group from masquerading as the acting leadership of the war veterans’ association.

This was not just a setback for Chimene and her group who thought they had been endorsed by Mugabe, but also a heavy blow to Mugabe who had already accepted them as the acting leadership.

The High Court has effectively backed the war veterans’ leadership, which has already been suspended or dismissed from Zanu PF. It might be said to be a victory for judicial independence to rule so openly against Mugabe’s wishes, but to the extent that it furthers the Lacoste faction’s interests, the judgement is of remarkable significance in the succession wars.

The mistake that Chimene made was to openly disparage the courts. In February this year, when the High Court issued an interdict against her, Chimene said: “I want to make it clear that I will not be barred from working with war veterans by a High Court order.

Is it the High Court that authorised me to fight in the liberation struggle? Do I need the High Court to verify whether I am a war veteran or not? So until a time when the High Court can approve who is or not a war veteran, only then can I abide by that order.” This was an ill-judged statement.

Judges don’t like politicians who undermine their authority so openly. Her G40 handlers failed to hold her back. Last week, she repeated similarly contemptuous comments when she stated, “Was the court there when we went to war? I was not invited to the liberation struggle by a court” This kind of behaviour by Chimene will only do more damage to the G40 faction’s credibility before the courts.

So, with the military, the war veterans, the state media and parts of the judiciary in his corner, Mnangagwa may just have clawed his way back from the humiliation he suffered at the hands of Chimene and the G40 a fortnight ago.

The G40 have Mugabe in their corner, but this will only last as long as he lives. Grace Mugabe herself is wearing borrowed robes. They don’t seem to have any other significant pillars in their corner. Meanwhile, Mugabe’s grip on the party is loosening. Apart from the war veterans’ communiqué of three weeks ago, there has been no direct challenge, but he would be unwise if he did not read the latent opposition and divergences from his former long-standing allies.

l This is an abridged version of the article which first appeared on Alex T. Magaisa’s blog last week. The full article can be found on [email protected]