THE High Court has set aside a default judgment that granted a Marondera-based company, Lowveld Leather Products (Pvt) Ltd, ownership of two farms the government says were acquired under the land reform programme.
Justice Nyaradzo Priscilla Munangati-Manongwa ruled in favour of two applicants, Obert Njazi and Francesco Marconati, who challenged the 2020 judgment.
The judge found the two had the legal standing to bring the case and that the original ruling was "erroneously sought and erroneously granted."
The disputed farms, known as Mlanje of Roraima and Clifton of Roraima, were subject to a default judgment in February 2020 (Case No. HCH 5530/19) which declared they had never been sold and belonged solely to Lowveld Leather Products.
Njazi and Marconati, represented by Lewis Uriri, filed separate applications for condonation for the late filing and rescission of that judgment.
They argued the land had been compulsorily acquired by the state under the former constitution and that such acquisition could not be reversed by a default court order.
The applicants contended that they hold legitimate rights from the state via an offer letter since 2013 and over a decade of occupation, and Marconati as a leaseholder.
They argued that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to restore private ownership in a default proceeding, especially without citing the president or relevant constitutional authority.
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They also challenged the validity of the original court papers' service, with Marconati disputing he was properly served.
The applicants maintained the default judgment had severe consequences, as it was used to remove the official "acquisition endorsement" from the title deeds.
Lowveld Leather Products opposed the applications, arguing the delay of several years was inordinate and unexplained.
They asserted that the applicants lacked a direct legal interest (locus standi), characterising Njazi as a "mere offer-letter holder" and Marconati's lease as expired.
The company maintained the original judgment was sound, that Marconati was properly served, and that any issue of state acquisition was moot or had been regularized.
Munangati-Manongwa rejected the company's arguments.
She ruled that holders of state-issued offer letters or leases have a "direct and substantial interest" in cases that seek to divest the State of acquired land, granting them the standing to sue.
"Whether the applicants have provided a reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay so as to warrant condonation. Condonation is not a mere formality,” the judge ruled
“It is an indulgence that lies within the discretion of the court and must be justified by a full and reasonable explanation for the delay, coupled with prospects of success.
“In HCH 2755/25, it is common cause that the applicant was not a party to HCH 5530/19 and was not cited therein.
“It is further common cause that he held an offer letter from as early as 2013 and had been in uninterrupted occupation of the land for over a decade.”
The judge affirmed that upon compulsory acquisition, ownership vests in the state, and those holding rights from the State are affected by any order attempting to reverse that.
The judge found the applicants provided a reasonable explanation for the delay.
She noted that Njazi only became aware of the judgment in 2023 and acted promptly, and that Marconati's challenge to the service of papers had merit.
The judge also ruled that the original default judgment was granted without proper jurisdiction.
"To that extent, the judgment was granted in circumstances where the court lacked jurisdiction and where material facts relating to the constitutional status of the land were either not placed before it or not interrogated,” the judge said.
“Such a judgment is, by definition, one that was erroneously sought and erroneously granted.
"The consolidated applications for condonation for late filing for rescission of default judgement and application for rescission of default judgement ought to succeed and is hereby granted.”
